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A New Elite? Politicians and Civil Servants 
in Scotland after Devolution1
BY MICHAEL KEATING AND PAUL CAIRNEY
DEVOLUTION in 1999 was widely heralded as an opportunity for a
‘new politics’ in Scotland. Power would not only be transferred from
London to Edinburgh, but would be more widely shared within Scotland.
There are several dimensions to the new politics, many of which con-
cern the revitalisation of civil society and new forms of participation.2
Our focus is more narrow, on the political and administrative elites as
represented by parliamentarians and senior civil servants. As far as pol-
iticians are concerned, the aim of devolution supporters was to broaden
recruitment and create a more open political class, more representative
of the country as a whole. There was a specific commitment to gender
equity among the parties represented in the Scottish Constitutional
Convention and a vaguer commitment to representativeness on other
dimensions. Devolution campaigners did not pay much attention to the
civil service, in spite of a general feeling that, given the nature of the
Scottish Office system, they had too much influence. There was, how-
ever, a parallel movement to broaden civil service recruitment in the UK
as a whole, and to bring in outsiders, especially from the private sector,
to senior positions. A decision was made at the outset to retain a single
British civil service in order that officials of the Scottish Executive
would have the opportunity to move back and forth from Whitehall
and into European secondments, rather than being confined to oppor-
tunities in Edinburgh. Our first hypothesis, then, is that devolution has
broadened the basis of elite recruitment.
In Britain and Europe more generally, however, there has been a gen-
eral trend for political recruitment to narrow to the professional middle
classes and those occupations that lend themselves easily to political life.3
Politics itself is increasingly a profession, with a defined career path and
few possibilities for interrupting it or for entering late. Recruitment to
the senior civil service may be less biased to the privately educated
upper classes than in the past, but increasingly dominated by people
from middle class professional families. Our counter-hypothesis is that
devolution, rather than opening up politics and administration, has
merely provided an opportunity to accelerate these trends, producing
parallel political and administrative elites that increasingly resemble
each other but are still distanced from civil society.
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In both cases, the null hypothesis is that devolution has made no dif-
ference to the prevailing trends. To test these hypotheses, we need to
assess trends over time both in Scotland and in the rest of the UK.
A Scottish administration had existed since 1885 in the form of the
Scottish Office and had gradually extended its functions over a hundred
years. Scottish MPs were somewhat distinct in their backgrounds and,
while following the UK line on policy matters, had a distinct niche in
the Westminster division of labour.4 So we need to identify long-term
trends that may be independent of devolution and assess the extent to
which Scotland was already convergent or divergent from the UK as a
whole. Then to assess the impact of devolution, we need to see whether
there is a break after 1999 and whether Scottish elites are diverging
from their UK counterparts. In the case of civil servants, such change is
liable to be slow and gradual as retirees are replaced by new recruits. In
the case of politicians, we can track the evolution of the Scottish mem-
bers at Westminster and compare these with the new parliamentarians
elected to the Scottish Parliament.
Backgrounds of MPs and MSPs
Since the Second World War, there has been something of a conver-
gence in the backgrounds of MPs from the two main British parties,
towards the middle class, university-educated professional. Labour has
lost its working-class element, while the Conservative benches have less
space for the upper-class, public-school element. By no means all the
old differences have disappeared, and there is a tendency among the
professional classes for Labour MPs to be from the public sector and
Conservatives from the private sector. Another general tendency has
been the rise of professional politicians, going straight from university
into political work, or at least into ‘politics-enabling’ professions, those
that give the flexible time to devote to politics and hone the communi-
cative skills required by politicians.5
Scotland before devolution seemed less affected by these trends. In
the post-war years, parliamentary representation from the two main
parties in Scotland conformed more closely than in England to the class
stereotypes.6 Labour MPs were more likely to be working class, trade
unionists and former councillors who entered Parliament as the culmi-
nation of a career in municipal politics. Few of them made it to high
office, especially outside of their reserved domain of the Scottish Office.
Scottish Conservative MPs, for their part, were disproportionately
upper class, public-school educated and with military backgrounds.
Indeed this tendency increased during the 1950s and 1960s with the
decline of urban Toryism.7 Looking at party representatives in the early
2000s in comparison allows us in principle to assess change over time
(by comparing MPs now and then) and the affects of institutional
change (by comparing Scottish and non-Scottish MPs with MSPs). In
practice, the comparison of Scottish MPs is limited to the Labour Party
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since the Conservatives elected no Scottish MPs in 1997 and only one in
2001 and 2005.
Comparing the backgrounds of politicians over such an extended
period of time raises a number of technical difficulties. Occupational
categories have changed with economic change and the growth of the
tertiary sector, as government now recognises with its revised classifica-
tion scheme. So working through the data with the same detailed occu-
pational categories would not make much sense or help in resolving our
central question. We are interested in changes in the broad socioeco-
nomic pattern of representation, in particular the transformation of
class politics. Yet the old class divisions are not as clear as in the past.
The blue-collar workers often taken as synonymous with the working
class have declined in number, but the new white-collar occupations
can by no means be taken as middle-class in the older sense of the word.
In any case, the standard census categories do not allow us to test our
central hypothesis about the rise of professionals and the decline of the
working-class representative. We have therefore designed operational
categories that allow us to do this. We have grouped routine and junior
white-collar workers with manual workers and distinguished these
from professionals on the one hand and private business managers on
the other. This gives us a fairly simple categorisation into professionals,
private business managers and blue- and white-collar workers.8 We
have also picked out occupations that are particularly important for
one or other party.
There is a large residual category, whose expansion over time is a
reflection of the rise of new occupations. It also, we would argue,
includes a new and important category of ‘professional politicians’,
some of whom have worked all their careers in politics (as party workers
or politicians’ assistants). Others have worked in ‘politics-facilitating’
occupations. This is difficult to categorise. Politics-facilitating occupa-
tions as defined by Anthony King include journalists, authors and those
in public relations, but also barristers, solicitors, lecturers and teachers
which are in our professional category.9 The politics-facilitating occu-
pations in our residual category include journalist, author, PR, political
worker/researcher, trade union official and full-time members of a
quango, interest group/think tank/lobbyist or member of another
assembly—but excluding lawyers and teachers.10
The second problem is that individuals may belong in more than
one category, either because they have changed occupations during
their career, or because for example they may be members of profes-
sions working in a private business. To deal with this, we have used
the formative occupation, that is the one in which a politician has
spent most of his or her pre-parliamentary career.11 This involves
some matters of judgement, especially as many Labour politicians in
the post-war years were upwardly mobile. Where needed, however,
we can control for this by looking at initial occupation if we want to
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know how many people are of working class origin. In fact, this dis-
tinction becomes less important over time as fewer people have started
in working-class occupations.
Looking at Labour MPs (Table 1) we see that they are progressively
more professional by background, but with Scottish MPs converging
with their non-Scottish counterparts. The Scottish Parliament, however,
marks a decisive shift, as MSPs are more ‘professional’ even than non-
Scottish Labour MPs. Looking at first occupations rather than forma-
tive ones, the institutional effect is even more marked (Table 2). Scottish
MPs are still more working class in origin than other Labour MPs, but
MSPs are more professional in origin than either. We also see an increase
in the ‘other’ categories. Many of these are in the politics-facilitating
occupations, including working for the parties or for MPs and MEPs.
6% of Labour MSPs had been political workers and another 6%
had worked with interest groups or think tanks. By contrast, the ‘other
politics-facilitating’ among the 1945–70 cohorts was dominated by
trade union officials (about 10% in Scotland and the rest of the UK).
Since most of these would have had working-class backgrounds, the
generic working class presence in that generation was even higher than
our figures show. There was also in that generation a significant
number who had at one time or another been insurance salesmen, pre-
sumably at that time a politics-facilitating occupation, giving flexible
working hours and ample opportunity to knock on doors. Among the
professions, teaching has been defined as politics facilitating by King13
and Norton14 and it is indeed heavily represented among politicians.
The teaching profession has a similar weight among Labour MPs and
1. Formative occupation of Scottish Labour MPs and MSPs (%)
Non-Scottish 
MPs 1945–70
Scottish MPs 
1945–70
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005
Scottish 
MPs 2005
MSPs 
2003
Professional 40.1 36.1 43.7 46.3 56.0
Business 10.1 5.2 7.7 4.9 4.0
Blue-collar and 
white-collar
23.2 42.3 8.4 9.8 2.0
Other—politics 
facilitating12
23.8 15.5 31.8 29.3 32.0
Other miscellaneous 2.8 0.9 8.4 9.8 6.0
2. First occupation, Labour MPs and MSPs
Non-Scottish MPs 2005 Scottish MPs 2005 MSPs 2003
Professional 44.4 41.5 54.0
Business 10.2 7.3 4.0
Blue-collar and white-collar 10.5 22.0 10.0
Other—politics facilitating 25.6 22.0 24.0
Other miscellaneous 9.3 7.3 8.0
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MSPs but the former include more university lecturers and the latter
more school teachers (a fifth of all Labour MSPs).
There has been a trend over the years for Labour MPs to be drawn
more from the professions and to converge in some respects with the
Conservatives.15 These findings, consistent with other analyses,16 show
that the Scottish Parliament has resulted in a marked acceleration in the
shift of Labour representation away from traditional working-class
backgrounds to the professional middle classes. There is still evidence of
upward mobility, comparing first (not shown) with formative occupa-
tions, but the difference between Holyrood and Westminster remains.
On the Conservative side (Table 3), we have included farmers and
landowners separately to illustrate the decline of this element in the rest
of the UK, but the continuation of its significance in Scotland since the
1950s and 1960s. The rise of the professions is evident here (as with
Labour), as is the decline in the presence of business people. The main
shift in the professional category is the decline of the military officer,
who between 1945 and 1970 accounted for 8% of all Conservative
MPs and no less than a quarter of Scottish Conservatives. There is some
evidence of people having worked all their lives in politics among the
Westminster contingent but not in Scotland. It should be said, however,
that the number of Conservative MSPs (18) is too small to read a lot
from the percentages. The 6% of workers in the ranks of Tory MSPs is
not a trend since it only amounts to one person. On the Conservative
side the difference between first occupation and formative occupation is
less significant, except for a group of people who moved into business
in the course of their careers and one MSP who moved from shipping to
a career in farming. As mentioned earlier, we cannot do a statistical
analysis on the backgrounds of Scottish Conservative MPs after 1997,
but a glance at the figures for 1992 (when they returned eleven mem-
bers, still too few for statistical significance) suggests that the profes-
sional dominance was already established (without the military officers)
but that the farmers had disappeared. Their limited return in the Scot-
tish Parliament is therefore interesting.
The professional bias also extends to Scottish ministers, over 60% of
whom are from this background. Among UK ministers, the number of
professionals is lower (40%) but there is a stronger representation
than in Scotland of business, despite the fact the UK government was
3. Formative occupation of Scottish Conservative MPs and MSPs (%)
Non-Scottish 
MPs 1945–70
Scottish MPs 
1945–70
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005
MSPs 
2003
Professional 39.9 44.0 36.8 55.6
Business 41.8 28.0 43.0 16.7
Blue-collar and junior white-collar 0.40 0.3 1.0 5.6
Farmer/landowner 9.9 18.6 3.6 16.7
Other—politics facilitating 6.4 2.8 13.0 5.6
Other miscellaneous 1.6 6.3 2.6 0
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homogeneously Labour while in Scotland Labour shared power with
the Liberal Democrats.
Of course, these trends might just reflect changes in Scottish society as
a whole. There is some truth in this, but it by no means explains the
trends over time or the differences between Scotland and England and
between Holyrood and Westminster. Scotland’s occupational structure
has resembled that of England since at least 192117 but the convergence
in the backgrounds of politicians is recent and particularly marked with
the arrival of the Scottish Parliament. The proportion of MSPs from a
professional background is higher than in Scottish society as a whole and
the domination of political representation by the professional classes has
increased faster than among the population at large.18 The almost complete
absence of the lowest occupational category in the Scottish Parliament con-
trasts with its continuing strong presence in Scottish society.19
Educational backgrounds also show a shift over time and between
institutions. Among Scottish Labour MPs the proportion with higher
educational qualifications increased steadily from 1945 to 2005 but
lagged consistently behind that of non-Scottish MPs (Table 4).20 By
2005, 78% of Scottish Labour MPs and 91% of non-Scottish Labour
MPs had tertiary qualifications. Among Labour MSPs it was 90%.
Nearly all the Scottish Labour politicians took their higher education in
Scotland, with only two MPs and no MSPs educated at Oxbridge, com-
pared with a fifth of non-Scottish Labour MPs. The proportion of non-
Scottish Labour MPs educated privately has remained at around 20%
since the war. It was always much smaller among Scottish MPs and
only two Labour MSPs in 2003 were educated privately. Again, this is
not adequately explained by differences in the levels of private educa-
tion in Scotland and England (currently 3.5% and 6%, respectively).
There was also a steady rise in graduates among Scottish Conserva-
tive MPs between 1945 and 1970 (from just over 50% to nearly 80%)
(Table 5). The proportion of Oxbridge graduates actually increased
over these years from 40% to 65%, as did the proportion of private
school products (from 46% to over 80%). This was connected with the
changing fortunes of Scottish Toryism, which historically had its origins
in Liberal Unionism of the late nineteenth century. The Unionist ele-
ment was dominant until after the Second World War, and until 1965
the party was officially called the Scottish Unionist Party, with no reference
4. Educational background of Labour MPs and MSPs (%)
All Labour 
MPs 1945–70
Scottish MPs 
1945–70
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005
Scottish 
MPs 2005
MSPs 
2003
Oxbridge 16.2 6.0 20.7 2.5 0
Other University 30.0 24.0 51.9 55.0 62.0
Other higher education – – 18.5 20.0 28.0
Independent school 21.5 4.0 20.9 10.0 4.0
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to Conservatism.21 Decline set in from the late 1950s and the party was
pushed back to its rural bases dominated by the traditional upper
classes. From the 1970s, however, the party did seem to become more
middle class. Comparison with the Scottish Conservative MPs in 1992
(with the usual caveat for the small numbers) suggests that the arrival of
the Scottish Parliament in 1999 accelerated this longer-term trend.
Two-thirds of Conservative MSPs were educated at state schools, com-
pared with 42% of all Conservative MPs elected in 2005. Less than
80% of Conservative MSPs had higher-level qualifications, lower than
non-Scottish Conservative MPs (93%), and only one (6%) was edu-
cated at Oxbridge compared to 45% of non-Scottish Conservative MPs.
The other two major parties in the Scottish Parliament—Scottish
National Party (28 MSPs) and Liberal Democrats (17)—continue this
professional trend (Table 6). No MSP from these parties has a blue- or
routine white-collar background. However, neither party shares Labour’s
public-sector dominance of its professional category, while business
backgrounds are higher in both parties (23% and 18% respectively).
There are high levels of higher education (93% and 83%, respectively)
(Table 7). The Liberal Democrat backgrounds are closer to the
5. Educational background of Conservative MPs and MSPs (%)
All Conservative
MPs 1945–70
Scottish MPs 
1945–70 
(1970 only)
Scottish 
MPs 1992
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005
MSPs 
2003
Oxbridge 50.0 48.5 (65.2) 27.2 44.8 5.6
Other University 16.0 15.3 54.5 40.2 61.1
Other higher 
education
– – 9.1 8.2 11.1
Independent school 77.0 63.8 (82.6) 54.5 58.0 33.3
6. Backgrounds of SNP and Liberal Democrat politicians (%)
SNP MSPs 
2003
LD MSPs 
2003
LD Scot 
MP 2005
LD non-Scottish 
MP 2005
Professional 50.0 29.4 36.4 36.7
Business 23.1 17.6 18.2 24.5
Blue-collar and white-collar 0 0 0 2.0
Other—politics facilitating 11.5 35.3 27.3 26.5
Other miscellaneous 15.4 17.6 18.2 10.2
7. Educational background SNP and Liberal Democrat politicians (%)
SNP MSPs LD MSPs LD Scottish 
MP 2005
LD non-Scottish 
MP 2005
Oxbridge 0 17.6 9.1 36.7
Other University 78.6 58.8 72.7 42.9
Other FE 14.3 5.9 18.2 12.2
Independent school 10.7 35.3 27.3 44.7
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Conservatives, with three Oxbridge graduates (18%) and 35% from
independent schools, while the SNP is closer to Labour. Further, the larg-
est Liberal Democrat professional category is ‘politics-facilitating’ (35%).
These figures mirror to some extent the backgrounds of Liberal Demo-
crat MPs in the UK.
The minor parties do little to modify this middle-class professional
bias. All seven Green Party MSPs have a university education and three
(43%) were educated privately. Three (43%) are drawn from the pub-
lic-sector professions, while four (57%) worked in and around the vol-
untary sector. This contrasts with the Scottish Socialist Party MSPs
(six), of which three (50%) have a further or higher education qualifica-
tion but none were taught privately. However, all of the SSP’s members
were drawn from the public sector (two) or politics-facilitating (four)
professions; indeed they have tended to be upwardly mobile people of
working-class origins taking the same route into politics as previous
generations of Labour politicians.
Scottish Labour parliamentary representation used to be marked by a
strong municipal element. Between 1945 and 1970, 53% of Scottish
Labour MPs had served in local government, against 43% of non-Scottish
Labour MPs (Table 8). These were often long-serving municipal wor-
thies and even fewer of them than Scottish MPs as a whole made it to
ministerial office.22 In recent years, as part of the rise of a professional
political class, service in local government is increasingly an apprentice-
ship for Parliament. On the Labour side, 64% of non-Scottish MPs
have municipal experience, while the figure among Scottish MPs has
remained rather stable at 54%. Contrary to much casual comment,
fewer Labour MSPs (44%) have a local government background, partly
because of an effort by the party not to encourage councillors to take
over the new institution.
Until their reconstitution as the Scottish Conservative Party in 1965,
the Scottish Tories had rarely contested seats in local government, pre-
ferring to back Progressive, Moderate or Independent groupings of
notables. The post-war years saw an increase in former councillors on
the Conservative side. The party’s presence in strength was rather short-
lived, as early advances were reversed in the 1980s and 1990s, but there
is now a cadre of Conservative former councillors available for higher
office. Among Conservative MPs as a whole 30% are former council-
lors. This is below the proportion at Holyrood (44%) although the
8. Former councillors
Non-Scottish 
MPs 1945–70
Scottish MPs 
1945–70
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005
Scottish MPs 
2005
MSPs 
2003
Labour 43.4 53.0 64.0 53.7 44.0
Conservative 26.2 23.6 32.0 na 44.4
Liberal Democrat na na 65.3 27.3 64.7
SNP na na na 16.7 28.6
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small numbers again reduce the significance of this difference. 65% of
Liberal Democrats in Holyrood have local government experience, a
figure comparable to that of its non-Scottish MPs, evidence of the way
in which the party has built itself up since the 1990s on it municipal
base. Only 29% of the SNP MSPs, however, have come from local gov-
ernment (its six MPs make statistical analysis meaningless).
Another traditional source of recruitment for Labour politicians is
the trade union movement. We do not have figures for those having
held trade union office in the post-war years, but of non-Scottish
Labour MPs elected in 2005, 32% were former union office holders.
Among Scottish Labour MPs the figure was higher at 40%, conforming
to the generally more traditional background, but among MSPs it fell to
28% (Table 9).
Measuring the Scottishness of Scottish politicians is fraught with dif-
ficulty, as this is a fluid category, with several available criteria and gra-
dations.23 There is no evidence of an ethnic filter or birth criterion. Just
three-quarters of all MSPs were born in Scotland and two-thirds were
both born and educated there, well under the proportions for the popu-
lation as a whole. This is consistent with the figures for Scottish MPs.
Until the early twentieth century, there had been a substantial number
of ‘carpet-baggers’ in Scotland but these declined rapidly after the First
World War and again in the 1950s.24 Of the 15 MSPs not born or edu-
cated in Scotland, most had quite long residence and indeed eight had
names indicating Scottish ancestry. These might be McCrone’s ‘return-
ing Scots’,25 with family connections that make it easier to assimilate
into Scottish public life.
One of the achievements of the Scottish Parliament has been to increase
the number of women in elected office. 40% of MSPs elected in 2003 were
women, just over double the proportion at Westminster (Table 10).
This is largely the result of Labour’s policy of gender parity in selections
for Holyrood, although women accounted for a fifth of Conservative
MSPs, also more than twice their proportion at Westminster. Gender equal-
ity, however, has been achieved at the cost of social representativeness,
9. Trade union officials among Labour MPs and MPS (%)
Non-Scottish MPs 2005 Scottish MPs 2005 MSPs 2003
31.5 43.9 28.0
10. Women MPs and MSPs (%)
Non-Scottish MPs 2005 Scottish MPs 2005 MSPs 2003
Labour 28.3 19.5 56.0
Conservative 8.8 0 22.2
Liberal Democrat 16.3 9.1 11.8
SNP na 33 35.7
52 Parliamentary Affairs
since women MSPs are even more professional (64%) in their background
than their male counterparts (46%).
The arrival of new parties in the Scottish Parliament has made it
more politically representative, bringing in ideas and political cultures
that were for a long time outside the political system. It has not, how-
ever, made political leadership more socially representative, but merely
reinforced existing trends towards the professional classes.
It is common in devolved or federal systems of government for politi-
cians to move from one level to another. This is not simply a matter of
progressing from lower to higher levels in the way politicians graduate
from local government to parliament. There is also a flow from the cen-
tre or federal level as senior politicians return home to take the leader-
ship of the devolved governments. It is striking that in Scotland this
phenomenon appears to be absent. Fifteen MPs made a one-way choice
in 1999 to move to the Scottish Parliament, although after 2003 only
10 of them were left. Another eight (six remaining in 2003) MSPs had
been MPs in the past, all except one from Scottish constituencies.26
Since then no MP or MEP has moved to the Scottish Parliament. Some
Conservative MSPs have looked to Westminster, where promotion
prospects might be better. One MSP (Conservative David Mundell in
2005) was elected to Westminster for a Scottish constituency and Ben
Wallace left the Scottish Parliament to secure a parliamentary seat in
England at the same election. The case of Alex Salmond, who resigned
from the SNP leadership and stayed at Westminster, then changed his
mind to resume both the leadership and the candidacy for his seat at
Holyrood (for 2007) is exceptional. The relationship between Westminster
and the Scottish Parliament thus shows neither centrifugal nor centripe-
tal tendencies in the form of a career train from periphery to centre or
vice versa, such as have been identified in some other federal and
devolved systems.27 It has its own career structure and apprenticeship
paths and provides its own leadership cadre.
This is partly to do with the rules common to Westminster and Holyrood
that ministers must be recruited from the ranks of parliamentarians,
a rule that does not apply in much of Europe. It is also rooted in the
traditional career paths of politicians who need to come up through
the backbenches, unlike in other countries. Most of all, it reflects the
strategies of the political parties, who have not encouraged the migra-
tion of politicians among parliaments, although there has been some
movement between Westminster and the European Parliament. Nor
have the parties sought to recruit star candidates outwith their own
ranks, as happens in Canada as a way to renew the political class. The
Liberal Democrats and Conservatives did seek to broaden their base in
1999 by inviting non-members to apply for candidatures (on condition
that they joined the party), but none seem to have been elected. Despite
the encouragement of the First Minister, the Labour Party refused to
waive its rules to admit the candidature of a prominent Asian businessman
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at a Scottish Parliament by-election in 2005. A few closet party supporters
had sat in local government as Independents in rural areas where party
politics does not operate and one of these, Convenor of Highlands
Regional Council, reached high office in the Executive as a Labour
MSP. Apart from this mode, which is not new, there was no significant
reaching beyond party ranks. Holyrood also resembles Westminster in
being a career-based parliament. Unlike in other countries, politicians
do not come in and out in the course of their lives since they know that,
outside Parliament, they will be forgotten. The influx of novice politi-
cians in 1999, some of whom went straight into Cabinet, thus looks like
a one-off effect of the new institution rather than a continuing practice.
The Civil Service
For many years, commentators have criticised the narrow recruitment
base of British senior civil servants, mostly men drawn from upper middle-
class families and educated at private schools and Oxbridge.28 While
the Scottish Office was an integral part of the British civil service
and committed to mobility, there was a tendency for civil servants to
spend their entire careers there, interrupted sometimes in the case of
high flyers by a spell in Whitehall (ideally in Treasury or Cabinet
Office) to acquire contacts and know-how. There was an Oxbridge
bias, as in 1968 a fifth of administrative class officials in the Scottish
Office had degrees from the ancient English universities, but this was
much less marked than in the case of Whitehall.29 Scottish Office offi-
cials tended to be native Scots who stayed mainly in Scotland. Some
fears were expressed at the time of devolution that mobility between
Edinburgh and London would be restricted and this was a decisive
argument in the decision to keep a unified civil service. Yet these fears
seem to have been based on an exaggerated idea of the mobility that
had existed before, often more of an aspiration and official policy than
a reality.
Comparing trends over time is difficult since the grading structure of
the civil service has changed considerably. For example, the old admin-
istrative class of senior civil servants included new recruits on the fast
track as well as higher officials. There is also some difficulty in compar-
ing across Whitehall and the Scottish Executive. The latter has only one
Permanent Secretary, making a statistical comparison meaningless. The
heads of Scottish departments might be a more meaningful comparison,
but they do not enjoy the same rank as heads of Whitehall departments
(who are Permanent Secretaries). We therefore present findings for
officials at various levels for comparison. There is in fact a fairly clear
picture.
There does seem a tendency for the proportion of senior Whitehall
civil servants educated privately to fall. Kavanagh and Richards show
the number of Permanent Secretaries educated privately fluctuated from
88% between 1974 and 1979 to 93% between 1979 and 1990 and to
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82% between 1990 and 1995.30 Our calculations show that it fell to
68% among those in office from 1997 to 2004 and in 2004 it was just
62%. Further, if we extend the coverage to grades 1–3 (paybands 2, 3
and PS) then the figure is 42%.31 In Scotland, in 2004, 33% of the
senior management (mostly heads of department) and 21% of heads of
group were educated privately. Therefore, if we compare the top civil
servants in each arena (Table 11) we find significant Scottish differ-
ences, with approximately half the proportion of Scottish civil servants
attending private schools (although the effect is less stark with a strict
comparison by grade). It is true that England has nearly twice the popu-
lation of privately-educated pupils as Scotland, but this could not be the
sole cause of the difference, since not all of the Scottish senior civil ser-
vice was educated in Scotland (see below). The significance of private
schools in England is not in the number of people they educate (which
is very small and even smaller for the elite ones) but in their role in the
formation of elites. Scottish private schools do not appear to do this to
anything like the same extent.
Scotland has, not surprisingly, always had a smaller proportion of
senior civil servants educated at Oxbridge than is found in Whitehall.
At 14%, the proportion of Oxbridge graduates among senior Scottish
Executive civil servants is about half than that in Whitehall but still sig-
nificant (Table 12). A third of the Scottish heads of department are
Oxbridge graduates compared with over 70% in Whitehall heads of
department (Table 11) or 48% of Whitehall payband 3 (Table 12).
Scottish civil servants tend to have been educated at Scottish universities
(64% of our SCS sample) and there is a smaller proportion than in
Whitehall (SCS as a whole) who have not been to university at all,
perhaps reflecting Scotland’s higher graduate population.
Other measures of ‘Scottishness’ also suggest that most Scottish
Executive civil servants were born (61%) and/or schooled (69%) in
11. Backgrounds of Permanent Secretaries and senior civil servants in Whitehall 
and the Scottish Executive32
Whitehall Permanent 
Secretary heads of 
department
Scottish Executive 2004
2004 1997–2004 Senior 
management 
group
Heads of 
group
Other SCS33
n % n % n % n % n %
Women 2 13 4 13 1 11 8 20 5 20
Men 13 87 27 87 8 89 31 80 18 80
Independent school 8 62 19 68 3 33 7 21 8 35
State school 5 38 9 32 6 67 27 79 15 65
Oxbridge 11 73 22 71 3 33 9 26 2 9
Other University/HE 4 27 9 29 5 56 24 69 21 91
No University 0 0 0 0 1 11 2 6 0 0
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Scotland. This is slightly lower (5 of 9, or 56%) for the senior management
group in both measures, while half of the eight university graduates
took their degrees in Scotland. Heads of group were slightly more likely
to have been born (65%), schooled (74%) and taught at a university
(65%) in Scotland.
Mobility still appears to be rather low. Of our SCS sample, 70% had
spent no time in a Whitehall department. While numbers are too small
for statistical significance, the figure is higher (78%) in the senior man-
agement group but slightly lower (66%) for heads of group. This last
figure reflects the fact that a significant number (7, or 20%) of heads of
group had transferred from Whitehall departments, perhaps in reflec-
tion of the greater potential for policy-influencing work at a relatively
low payband (2 or 3) within the senior civil service in the Scottish
Executive.
While an achievement of the Scottish Parliament has been to increase
the number of women in elected office, this has not yet been replicated
in the civil service. The number of women appointed to Permanent Sec-
retary level in Whitehall was 0% between 1974 and 1979, 1.1%
between 1979 and 1990 and 7% between 1990 and 1995.36 By 2004
the figure had increased significantly (albeit from this low base) to 13%
(Table 11). In Scotland the figures are similar if we focus on the most
senior levels. One person or 11% of the senior management group is
female, with greater representation in heads of group and other SCS
(20%). If we examine the SCS as a whole (Table 13), then the picture is
mixed. While more women are represented in the lowest paybands
(1 and 1A, or grades 4 and 5) in Scotland, we see higher representation
in the more senior UK posts. Indeed, if we examine payband 3—the
equivalent of most of the senior management group—then Whitehall
has almost double the proportion of women as does the Scottish Executive.
Devolution has not therefore provoked a sharp change in the civil
service in Scotland. Instead the unified British civil service has shared
the same trends. This even extends to external recruitment, although
12. Senior civil service by higher education and payband 200334
Payband
1 1A 2 3 PS Total
Whitehall departments35
No University % 28 23 19 19 11 26
Other University % 49 53 47 34 41 48
Oxbridge % 22 23 34 48 48 26
n 2057 146 541 113 27 2884
Scottish Executive
No University % 8 8 3 11 0 7
Other University % 80 87 69 56 100 78
Oxbridge % 12 5 29 33 0 14
n 118 38 35 9 1 201
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official figures tend to overstate public–private sector mobility and
detailed figures are difficult to find. From what we know, external
appointments are highest in health departments, reflecting the tradition
of recruiting chief medical, nursing and other positions from the NHS.
In Whitehall, health accounts for around 20% of all external appoint-
ments and one-third at the payband 3 level. In the Scottish Executive,
health accounts for five of ten external appointments. This includes the
only appointment within the senior management group, while two of
the four appointments at payband 2 level came from the NHS (and two
from local government).
Conclusion
Devolution has caused a shift in political representation in Scotland but,
gender aside, it has not widened it. Rather devolution has accelerated the
trend towards professional middle-class leadership. From lagging behind
the UK in this evolution, Scotland has now overtaken it. This substanti-
ates our second hypothesis, that there has been a change as a result of
devolution, but this has not been in a new direction. A distinct Scottish
political class has emerged, with its own career trajectory separate from
the UK one. This is perhaps not entirely new, since there was a tendency
in the post-war years for Scottish MPs to specialise either in Scottish or
in UK affairs, but there is now an institutional boundary which forces
the choice. Differences in the social class backgrounds of politicians
from the main parties have diminished as all have converged on the same
professional pattern. Perhaps the most significant difference is the
greater tendency for Labour MSPs to be drawn from the public sector
but Conservative, SNP and Liberal Democrat MSPs from the private.
Patterns among civil servants have changed less dramatically as they
are renewed only slowly and the Scottish Executive inherited its officials
from the Scottish Office. They were always drawn less from upper-class
backgrounds (as measured by private education) than their Whitehall
counterparts and the gap has remained as the upper-class element has
13. Senior civil service by gender and payband 2003
* Values are expressed as n (%).
Payband
Senior civil 
service
Gender 1 1A 2 3 PS Grand total
Whitehall 
departments37
Female* 681 (27) 30 (19) 148 (25) 26 (20) 4 (13) 889 (26)
Male* 1805 (73) 124 (81) 444 (75) 107 (80) 28 (88) 2508 (74)
Total 2486 154 592 133 32 3397
Scottish
Executive
Female* 42 (35) 9 (20) 5 (14) 1 (11) 0 (0) 57 (27)
Male* 79 (65) 35 (80) 30 (86) 8 (89) 1 (100) 153 (73)
Total 121 44 35 9 1 210
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fallen. Here our hypotheses are not substantiated since devolution has
not made a separate impact. The result is a civil service with a class and
educational background rather similar to that of the politicians, espe-
cially of the ministers in the Executive. Civil servants in the past tended
to stay in Scotland during their careers and devolution does not seem to
be making a difference here. The Scottish Executive is committed to a
similar pattern of civil service reform as is Whitehall, involving more
recruitment from outside and open competition for posts. This has pro-
duced some results (notably in health) although outsiders have usually
come from other parts of the public sector.
We do not have systematic data on the social background of leaders
of interest groups and civic associations in Scotland, but our informed
impression is that they are led by people of a similar background to the
political and administrative elites.38 Lindsay Paterson has emphasised
the continuing role of middle-class civic Scotland after devolution, con-
trasting them with other, demotic forces elsewhere in the society.39 This
is consistent with our findings about elites and the direction in which
they are evolving. While bureaucratic and political elites are, as else-
where in the UK, separate, there is an interpenetration of party politics
and civic Scotland as many MSPs are drawn from the ranks of interest
groups and voluntary associations, while others come from the public-
sector professions involved in similar activities. The presence of private
business and of private-sector trade unionists, by contrast, is rather low.
It would be an error to read off political attitudes directly from the
backgrounds of politicians, but the presence of public-sector profession-
als is also consistent with the greater consensus in Scotland around tra-
ditional models of public service provision and the lesser enthusiasm for
the forms of privatisation, quasi-privatisation and competition found in
England. It is also consistent with the greater emphasis on consensus
and negotiation in public policy-making, in consultation with service
providers.40
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